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College wage premiums and skills: a 
cross-country analysis
Rolf van der Velden* and Ineke Bijlsma**
Abstract: Workers with a college degree earn substantially more than workers with no such degree. 
Using recent data from 22 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) coun-
tries, we estimate this college wage premium at 28 per cent for male full-time working employees, on 
average, ranging from 18 per cent in Sweden to 50 per cent in the Slovak Republic. This premium is 
largely explained by the higher skill levels of graduates from higher education combined with their 
use of these skills at work, as well as the match with job requirements for this skill proficiency and 
skill use. We find no effect of labour market institutions (e.g. the employment protection legislation 
or the coverage rate) on cross-country differences in the college wage premium. However, we find that 
cross-country variation in this premium is related to the relative supply of higher educated workers. 
Moreover, we find evidence that cross-country differences in the college wage premium are related to 
the degree to which educational credentials signal skills.
Keywords: college wage premium, skills, skill use, (mis)match, relative supply, signalling, institutions
JEL classification: I26, J24
I. Introduction
Workers with a college degree earn substantially more than their peers who have no such 
degree, the so-called college wage premium (James, 2011; Crivellaro, 2014). However, 
the large increase in higher education enrolment has cast doubt on the sustainability 
of this college wage premium (Thurow, 1975; Freeman, 1976) and highlighted possible 
negative effects of overeducation (Bills, 2003). In the public debate, concerns have been 
expressed about the further expansion of the education system, resulting in growing 
unemployment rates among graduates, and increasing proportions of graduates unable 
to find a job for which a college degree is necessary. Even policy-makers who have wel-
comed the expansion of higher education in the past are now concerned about increas-
ing skill mismatches in the labour market (European Commission, 2013; OECD, 2015).
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Surprisingly, and despite the sharp increase in higher education enrolment, the college 
wage premium has not decreased substantially over time. In the United States, there was 
even an increase in the premium in the 1980s and 1990s. In the United Kingdom, the col-
lege wage premium has remained more or less stable in the past two decades, although 
it seems to have declined since 2002 (Walker and Zhu, 2008). Crivellaro (2014), using 
data from the EU-SILC (European Survey of Income and Living Conditions) and the 
ECHP (European Community Household Panel), shows that changes in supply and 
demand have an effect on the college wage premium. The author shows that an increase 
in the relative supply of higher educated workers decreases the college wage premium.
The most prominent explanation of possible stability in the college wage premium 
is that demand for highly skilled workers has increased at the same time. The so-called 
skill-biased technological change (SBTC) explanation was first formulated by Katz and 
Murphy (1992), who analyse changes in the US college wage premium over the period 
1963–87. Later, Goldin and Katz (2007, p. 1) extended this analysis to 1890–2005 and 
conclude that in the ‘race between education and technology, the strong secular growth 
in the relative demand for more educated workers combined with fluctuations in the 
growth of relative supplies go far to explain the long-run evolution of US educational 
wage differentials’.1
A crucial assumption in the SBTC explanation is that skills explain the college wage 
premium. In other words, the premium for having a college degree is driven by the 
(on average) higher skill level of graduates. Although this seems plausible, there are 
alternative explanations. The relative stability of the college wage premium could also 
be due to institutional factors, such as wage setting mechanisms and labour market 
regulations. One potential explanation for the differences in the college wage premium 
between the United States and many European countries is that, in the latter countries, 
institutional factors play a more dominant role, thus reducing overall wage inequality 
as well as the relative college wage premium. However, Crivellaro (2014), using data 
from the EU-SILC and the ECHP shows that changes in supply and demand drive 
most of the changes in the college wage premium and that institutional factors such as 
the employment protection legislation (EPL), union density, or minimum wages play no 
role or just a minor one.
Another alternative explanation is that it is the sorting function of education and not 
skills that drive the college wage premium (Arrow, 1973; Bills, 2003). In this view, edu-
cation is merely a machine that sorts students by their innate learning ability rather than 
equipping them with skills that are directly needed in the labour market. Alternatively, 
higher education is viewed as a gateway to prestigious jobs (Collins, 1979). Prestigious 
jobs are rationed and higher education serves as a channel to obtain these jobs. Social 
capital and networking are, in this view, just as important to gain access to these jobs as 
acquiring the right kinds of skills. All of these alternative explanations put into ques-
tion the relation between enrolment in higher education, skill development, and access 
to well-paid jobs.
It is not easy to directly test these alternative explanations but they can be tested indi-
rectly by looking at the mediating effect of skill levels to explain the relation between 
college degrees and the wage premium. If  this mediating effect is strong, alternative 
1 As one of the reviewers pointed out, Goldin and Katz (2007) do not control for foreign trade effects, 
which could specifically decrease the wages for unskilled workers.
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explanations (sorting on innate learning abilities, social capital formation during stud-
ies) are less convincing. Let us look at the puzzle regarding the effect of increasing 
enrolment in higher education and the effect this has on student skill development. 
Many authors assume that the increase in enrolment rates will also have changed the 
skills composition of the higher educated, since the expansion is likely to come from the 
least-skilled high school graduates (assuming that the best-skilled high school gradu-
ates will already have entered higher education). Grogger and Eide (1995) explore this 
issue using two sets of panel data and analyse the increase in the college wage premium 
in the United States during the 1980s. They conclude that skills obtained prior to col-
lege had no effect on this change in the wage premium, but that the distribution over 
college majors changed in favour of fields requiring a high level of analytical skills, 
such as engineering. These changes in the choice of college major account for one-
fourth of the increase in the male college wage premium. Walker and Zhu (2008) take a 
different approach. They analyse UK labour force data during 1994–2006. They show 
that, despite the huge increase in higher education participation rates, the college wage 
premium did not change much. However, they find that the college wage premium is 
not distributed evenly over the entire wage distribution. They show a fall in the col-
lege wage premium for men in the bottom quartile of the distribution of unobserved 
skills. Crivellaro (2014) uses an instrumental variable (IV) approach to assess the causal 
effect of changes in the supply of graduates. In comparing the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and IV results, the author concludes that the OLS results are upward biased and 
speculates that this could be due to changes in the relative ability of college graduates. 
Such analyses are frequently hampered by the fact that skills are often not directly 
measured and, therefore, assumptions have to be made about the underlying mecha-
nism. Levels et al. (2014) open up this black box of the relationship between education, 
skills, and wages and use data from the newly developed Program for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) from the OECD (2013a), to explain the 
effect of educational mismatches on wages. They find that the negative effect of over-
education on wages is largely explained by skills, but the extent to which this is the case 
differs between countries, and is constrained by labour market institutions. Hanushek 
et al. (2015) also use PIAAC data to assess the effect of skills on wages. They show 
that a one standard deviation increase in numeracy2 skills is associated with an 18 per 
cent increase in wages for prime-age workers. However, these returns differ markedly 
between countries.
Levels et al. (2014) focus on explaining the effects of overeducation on wages and 
look at the role of skills and labour market institutions. Hanushek et al. (2015) focus 
on the effect of skills on wages and control for school attainment to make their case. 
We take a different approach and determine how the college wage premium is related to 
skills and their use, as well as differences in the match between required and acquired 
skills. Although the relation between the college wage premium and skills is intuitively 
appealing, it has not been directly tested from a cross-country perspective with good 
2 It is important to note that numeracy skills are defined as a key skill that affects many outcomes in life 
(OECD, 2013a). Numeracy is defined as ‘the ability to access, use, interpret, and communicate mathematical 
information and ideas in order to engage in and manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations 
in adult life’ (OECD, 2013a, p. 59). Numeracy has been shown to be the strongest predictor of wages of all 
assessed key skills (Levels et al., 2014; Hanushek et al., 2015).
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estimates of skill (mis)matches. Neither has the negative relation between high college 
participation rates and the quality (skills) of graduates been explored. We elaborate 
on this using the PIAAC data. This data set provides a good opportunity to examine 
college wage premiums and the extent to which they are explained by skills. Since these 
are cross-sectional data, we will not be able to look at changes over time, nor will we be 
using an IV approach to address the causality between schooling variables, skills, and 
wages. In that sense, the analysis is predominantly explorative and descriptive. Its con-
tribution lies in the fact that we shed light on the nature of the college wage premium, 
how it varies across countries, whether the premiums are related to differences in cross-
country differences in skill profiles, the use of these skills and skill (mis)matches, and 
whether the cross-country variation in these premiums is related to the relative supply 
of higher educated, to the reliability of educational credentials, or to labour market 
institutions such as the EPL or the coverage rate.
The results show that the college wage premium is explained not only by the skills, 
but also by the extent to which these skills are actually used on the job and the extent 
to which there is a match between job requirements (in terms of skill proficiency level 
and skill use) and the actual proficiency level and skill use of the job holder. This effect 
is stronger for the case of workers in the private sector, where the college wage premium 
drops by 72 per cent after controlling for these factors. For workers in the public sec-
tor, this drop in the college wage premium is slightly less, 45 per cent, indicating that 
institutional factors also play a role in determining the college wage premium in the 
public sector. We show that cross-country differences in the college wage premium are 
clearly related to the relative supply of the higher educated. Controlling for skills, we 
find the relative supply of the higher educated in the relevant workforce has a negative 
effect on the college wage premium. We also show that cross-country differences in the 
college wage premium are somewhat related to how strongly educational credentials 
signal skills (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). In countries where this signal is strong, the 
college wage premium is highest. This is even the case when we control for skills at the 
individual level, suggesting that this signalling value also increases the wage premium 
for the college educated who lack such skills. We find no effect of labour market institu-
tions such as the EPL or the coverage rate on cross-country differences in the college 
wage premium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. 
Section III develops the model and underlying hypotheses. Section IV presents the 
results and section V concludes the paper.
II. Data
We use the PIAAC data set (OECD, 2013b), which assesses the proficiency of the adult 
population in key information-processing skills in OECD countries. The survey is 
designed to be cross-culturally and cross-nationally valid. The original data set com-
prises 24 countries and about 166,000 respondents. The national samples are repre-
sentative samples of non-institutionalized persons aged 16 to 65. Most countries have 
around 5,000 respondents in the sample, with the exception of Canada, which has more 
than 27,000 respondents. We excluded Australia from this data set because of data 
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protection rules, and the Russian Federation because we are not sure about the data 
quality. We took a random sample of 20 per cent of the Canadian sample to avoid its 
overrepresentation in the total data set.
The PIAAC survey comprises a combination of  computer-based assessment 
and—for those who were unable or unwilling to take the computer-based test—
paper and pencil data collection strategies to assess the proficiency of  respondents 
in three key information-processing skills: numeracy, literacy, and problem solving 
in technology-rich environments. We focus only on numeracy. Note, however, that 
the PIAAC test of  numeracy is more than simply reflecting school-based knowledge 
of  arithmetic and mathematics. It is regarded as a key information-processing skill 
in managing demands in a range of  situations in adult life that require a mathemati-
cal understanding. As such, it is a key predictor of  many outcomes, such as income, 
social status, civic participation, and health (OECD, 2013a; Levels et  al., 2014). 
Adaptive testing and item response techniques are used to calculate 10 plausible 
values. Together, these plausible values on numeracy provide an unbiased estimate of 
the ‘real’ score if  the respondent had taken all the numeracy-related items (OECD, 
2013b). The numeracy scale ranges from zero to 500, with an OECD international 
average of 273.
For the analysis, we selected male full-time working employees to avoid different 
wage-setting regimes for part-timers and women.3 In addition, the relation between 
skills and earnings for the self-employed is quite different from that for employees. 
Full-time is defined as working 32 hours or more per week. We only selected respond-
ents for whom we have valid information on skill proficiency, skill use, occupation, and 
hourly wages.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages.4 Wages are trimmed, leav-
ing out the first and 99th percentiles of the respondents in each country.
As predictors, we use the respondent’s highest level of completed education, distin-
guishing higher educated (International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 
5 and 6), medium educated (ISCED 3 and 4), and low educated (ISCED 1 and 2). In 
all models, we further control for age and age squared. We assess the role of skills in 
explaining the college wage premium in three different ways. First, we use the respond-
ent’s proficiency level in numeracy. We use the average of 10 plausible values standard-
ized with mean zero and standard deviation one.
Second, we use a concept called proficient skill use, developed by van der Velden and 
Bijlsma (2015). The basic rationale of these authors is to integrate skill proficiency and 
skill use into a new concept, proficient skill use. Proficient skill use is defined as a mul-
tiplicative function of skill proficiency in a domain and the use of skills in that domain. 
The intuitive understanding of this concept is that a skill can have no effect if  it is not 
being used and, vice versa, using a skill can have only little impact if  the proficiency 
level is low. For further information on the development and rationale of this concept, 
see van der Velden and Bijlsma (2015).
Third, van der Velden and Bijlsma (2015) also developed skill match indicators using 
this concept of proficient skill use. We follow them and distinguish five relevant situations:
3 As a robustness check, we also ran the same analyses for full-time working women. These results are 
qualitatively the same. The results are available upon request.
4 Hourly wages are all adjusted for cross-national differences by a purchasing power parity conversion.
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 - a respondent has the required skills and uses these as required,
 - a respondent has more skills than required but uses these as required,
 - a respondent has fewer skills than required but uses these as required,
 - a respondent has the required skills but uses these more than required,
 - a respondent has the required skills but uses these less than required.
Each of these situations leads to different returns of proficient skill use. The returns are higher 
for skill proficiency level than for skill use and higher when skills are required than when 
they are not. To estimate average skill proficiency and skill use levels for each International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) two-digit occupation in the different coun-
tries, the authors follow the calculations of Allen and Bijlsma (2015), who developed robust 
occupational skill profiles for each country and each two-digit ISCO occupation. Estimates 
were made for all two-digit occupations, with the exception of army occupations (ISCO 0).
At the country level, we use the following indicators.
 - The percentage of higher educated (ISCED 5 and 6) among full-time working 
male employees (based on PIAAC). This variable ranges from 15 per cent in Italy 
to 55 per cent in Japan.
- The reliability of educational credentials. This is defined as the correlation 
between an individual’s years of schooling and numeracy proficiency level at the 
country level. This correlation ranges from 0.37 in Cyprus to 0.56 in Belgium.
 - The EPL index (OECD, 2012a). This variable measures the extent of labour mar-
ket regulation based on a number of indicators related to the strictness of regula-
tions on dismissals and temporary contracts. It has a range of 0.26 in the United 
States to 2.92 in the Czech Republic.5
 - The coverage rate. This variable is defined6 as the number of employees covered 
by a collective agreement, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners 
in a country, based on the OECD (2012b). The variable has a range of 13.6 per 
cent in the United States to 99 per cent in Austria.
The resulting data set includes 22 countries and 32,420 individuals. To avoid outliers 
in the distribution of skill proficiency per country-specific ISCO two-digit category, we 
omit the first and 99th percentiles of respondents in each occupation per country. This 
leaves us with a working sample of 29,550 individuals.
III. Model
As outlined in the introduction, from a human capital perspective we expect the college 
wage premium to be driven by skills. So, we expect the following.
H1: The college wage premium is partly explained by the higher proficiency in the key 
information skills of higher-educated workers compared to medium-educated workers.
However, this is not sufficient. Skills can only have an effect on worker productivity if  
they are actually used at work. The concept of proficient skill use captures this idea, 
5 See http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/EPL-timeseries.xlsx.
6 See http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3554.
Rolf van der Velden and Ineke Bijlsma502
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/oxrep/article-abstract/32/4/497/2236422 by U
niversiteit M
aastricht user on 06 August 2019
since it is defined as the multiplicative effect of skill proficiency and skill use (van der 
Velden and Bijlsma, 2015). It reflects the idea that productivity is highest when workers 
have a high proficiency level and use these skills more intensely. We therefore propose 
the following hypothesis.
H2: The college wage premium is partly explained by the greater proficient skill use of 
key information skills of higher-educated workers compared to medium-educated workers. 
This effect of proficient skill use is greater than the effect of skill proficiency alone.
However, the college wage premium is only partly determined by an individual’s skills or 
proficient skill use. Research on over- and undereducation shows that wages are determined 
not only by actual years of schooling but also—and even more so—by required years of 
schooling (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Sattinger, 1993, 2012; Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; Allen and van der Velden, 2001; McGuiness, 2006; Quintini, 
2011) and that the returns to overschooling are weaker. This argument is best explained by 
matching theory. Productivity is highest when workers’ skills are a good match to the skills 
that are required in the job. Overskilling is also rewarded, but not fully, since the utiliza-
tion of these additional skills is restricted by job characteristics. Conversely, underskilling 
will yield a wage penalty, since these workers will not reach the same productivity level as 
their co-workers with matching skills. It is therefore important to include measures of skill 
match and mismatch. We therefore present the following hypothesis.
H3: The college wage premium is partly explained by the better match of higher-educated 
workers with jobs that require the more proficient skill use of key information skills. This 
effect of better matching with required proficient skill use is greater than the effect of 
proficient skill use alone.
In the introduction, we already indicated that there are large differences in the average 
college wage premium across countries. These could be partially explained by country 
differences in the skill profiles of the higher educated, their use of skills in the work situ-
ation, or country differences in the extent to which graduates can find a matching job 
in terms of the required proficient skill use. However, as indicated by previous authors, 
other characteristics could play a role as well. As a first obvious explanation, we expect 
a country’s college wage premium to be dependent on the relative supply of higher edu-
cated. This brings us to our next hypothesis.
H4: Country differences in the college wage premium are partly explained by the relative 
supply of higher-educated workers: the greater the numbers of higher educated, the lower 
the premium.
An alternative explanation is the signalling value of national diplomas. Some educa-
tional systems provide more reliable signals about a student’s actual skills than others 
(van der Velden, 2011). This is reflected in the correlation between years of schooling 
and skills in a country and the following is hypothesized.
H5: Country differences in the college wage premium are partly explained by the signalling 
value of diplomas: the college wage premium will be higher in countries where diplomas 
more strongly signal differences in underlying skills.
Finally, country differences in the college wage premium could be related to labour mar-
ket institutions. The more strongly the labour market is institutionalized (as reflected 
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in the EPL or the coverage rate), the higher the college wage premium, after skills are 
controlled for, which brings us to our last hypothesis.
H6: Country differences in the college wage premium are partly explained by differences 
in labour market institutions (indicated by the EPL or coverage rate): the college wage 
premium, after controlling for skills, is higher in countries with stronger labour market 
institutions.
We use standard Mincer (1974) wage regressions to assess the effect of college degrees 
on wages. We use a multilevel model to account for the nested structure, allowing for the 
clustering of errors at the country level. We estimate the following model:
 W a bHE cLE dC u vic c ic ic ic ic c= + + + + +       (1)
where Wic is the natural logarithm of the hourly wages of individual i in country c, ac 
is a country-specific constant, and HEic and LEic are two dummies indicating whether 
individual i is high educated (ISCED 5 and 6) or low educated (ISCED 1 and 2). The 
reference category comprises the medium educated (ISCED 3 and 4). The term Cic is a 
vector of control variables (with only two variables, age and age squared) and uic and vc 
are idiosyncratic error terms at the individual and country level, respectively. In the next 
model, we include the numeracy proficiency level Sic:
 W a bHE cLE dS eC u vic c ic ic ic ic ic c= + + + + + +       .  (2)
A comparison between the college wage premiums denoted by parameters b in equa-
tions (1) and (2) shows how it is reduced when we control for numeracy skills. In a 
human capital framework, we can assume that this numeracy skill proficiency level can 
only account for the college wage premium if  these skills are actually used. That is why 
our next model includes the concept of proficient skill use. We estimate the following 
model, where PSUic is proficient skill use:
 W a bHE cLE dPSU eC u vic c ic ic ic ic ic c= + + + + + +       .  (3)
Of course, higher skills and the use of these skills should only matter if  these skills and 
their use are actually required in the job. Skills that are not required on the job should 
have a lower premium and the same would hold for their use:
 W a bHE cLE dSM eC u vic c ic ic ic ic ic c= + + + + + +        (4)
where SMic is a vector of skill match variables, including the five (mis)match variables 
developed by van der Velden and Bijlsma (2015) and described in section II.
As a robustness check, we also estimate equations (1) to (4) using the percentile rank in the 
country-specific wage distribution as the dependent variable. This is to check whether, in cer-
tain countries with a compressed wage distribution, the models fit better if we use the rank 
score rather than the logarithm of wages. The conclusions remain qualitatively the same.7
We continue the analysis by estimating equation (4) separately for low-, medium-, and 
high-educated workers. Next, we test a model in which we assess whether the college 
wage premium differs between those working in the public sector and those working 
7 Results available upon request.
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in the private sector, by estimating equations (1)–(4) separately for public- and private-
sector workers, respectively.
Finally, we run the analyses separately for each country and relate the college wage 
premium from equations (1)–(4) to a number of country characteristics. These analyses 
indicate whether certain country characteristics can explain the cross-country variation 
in the college wage premium, both with and without controls for the skills, proficient skill 
use, and skill (mis)match variables. We report only the results for equation (4) (control-
ling for country differences in skills, proficient skill use, and skill (mis)match variables).8
IV. Results
Table 1 displays the results from equations (1)–(4).
The first column of Table 1 indicates the average college wage premium in the PIAAC 
data. Compared to their peers with a medium level of education (ISCED 3 and 4), full-
time working male employees with a college degree or above (ISCED 5 and 6) earn, on 
average, 28 per cent more. Given that most degrees take 4 years to complete, on average, 
this corresponds to a 7 per cent increase in wages per additional year of schooling. We 
also find that the penalty for not having a full upper secondary qualification is 16 per 
cent. This premium/penalty drops considerably once we control for numeracy skills in 
model 2. The drop in the wage penalty for the low educated is largest, from 16 to 8 per 
cent, a drop of 50 per cent, indicating that most of the wage penalty for the low educated 
is related to low numeracy skills. The drop in the college wage premium is 30 per cent, 
dropping from 28 to 20 per cent. These findings confirm H1: the college wage premium is 
indeed partially explained by the higher skill levels of degree holders.
8 The other results are available upon request.
Table 1: College wage premium in different models (equations 1–4)
Variables 
Model 1
(Eq. 1)
Model 2
(Eq. 2)
Model 3
(Eq. 3)
Model 4
(Eq. 4)
Low educated –15.819*** –7.892*** –6.742*** –5.755***
(0.741) (0.739) (0.726) (0.719)
High educated 28.465*** 19.870*** 16.442*** 10.684***
(0.512) (0.532) (0.537) (0.553)
Controls
Age and age squared yes yes yes yes
Numeracy yes
Proficient skill use yes
Skill mismatch variables yes
Number of individuals 29,552 29,552 29,552 28,974
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
BIC 28,896.1 26,989.1 26,123.4 24,233.7
Variance components
Between variance 0.095 0.097 0.098 0.092
Within variance 0.155 0.145 0.141 0.134
Total variance 0.250 0.242 0.239 0.226
Notes: Parameters multiplied by 100; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Model 3 includes proficient skill use instead of the skill level itself. The rationale is that the 
college wage premium can be a premium for higher skills, but only if these skills are actually 
used on the job. The concept of proficient skill use takes that into account. We can see that 
the college wage premium drops further, to 16 per cent, which suggests that 42 per cent of 
the original college wage premium is related to higher skill levels and their use on the job. 
We also note a further drop in the wage penalty among the lower educated, to 7 per cent, 
indicating that 57 per cent of the original wage penalty is related to lower numeracy levels 
and the lower use of these skills on the job. This confirms H2: the college wage premium is 
better explained by the proficient skill use of degree holders than by their skill levels alone.
Model 4 includes five skill (mis)match variables developed by van der Velden and 
Bijlsma (2015). This model controls for the fact that lower and higher educated workers 
could obtain different returns for proficient skill use depending on whether the skill level 
or the use of skills is a match or not. We observe a slight further drop in the wage penalty 
for the lower educated, from 7 to 6 per cent, indicating that 64 per cent of the original 
wage penalty is related to differences in the returns to matches or mismatches for profi-
cient skill use. More interestingly, we note a strong drop in the college wage premium, to 
11 per cent, indicating that 62 per cent of the original college wage premium is related to 
differences in the returns to matches or mismatches for proficient skill use.
Table 2 shows the estimates of equation (4) separately for low, medium, and higher 
educated.9
Table 2 shows that most of the estimates are highest for the high educated and lower 
for the low educated. As an illustration, a one standard deviation increase in typically 
required numeracy skills with typically required use increases wages for the higher edu-
cated by 15.5 per cent (= 1.036*1.5*10).10 An equivalent increase in required numeracy 
skills among the lower educated yields a premium of 10.9 per cent. The wage premium 
for one standard deviation more skills than required is 9.7 per cent for the higher edu-
cated and 6.8 per cent for the low educated. Finally, having one standard deviation 
fewer skills than are typically required on the job leads to a wage penalty of 10.0 per 
cent for the high educated and 8.6 per cent for the low educated.
Is the college wage premium different for public-sector and private-sector workers? 
Table 3 presents the analyses of equations (1)–(4) separately for those working in the 
public and private sectors.
The results in Table 3 show that the college wage premium is highest in the private 
sector (29.5 per cent vs 24.8 per cent) but the penalty for being low educated is highest 
in the public sector (20.3 per cent vs 14.4 per cent). Moreover, educational wage effects 
in the private sector are driven more by the match between required skills and skill 
use. The college wage premium in the private sector drops from 29.5 to 9.9 per cent 
in model 4 after including the (mis)match variables, a decrease of  67 per cent. In the 
public sector, the college wage premium drops from 24.8 per cent in model 1 to 11.3 
per cent in model 4, a decrease of  55 per cent. For the lower educated, the drop in the 
9 As a robustness check, we also estimated equation (4) by field of study (results available upon request). 
This was done only for the high educated. The results indicate that the returns to required numerical skills do 
not differ between the different fields of study, such as science and engineering versus social science, business, 
and law. However, the returns to having higher numerical skills than typically required are highest in the sci-
ence and engineering sector, as would be expected.
10 For more information on this calculation, see van der Velden and Bijlsma (2015).
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wage penalty compared to medium-educated workers is 72 per cent in the private sec-
tor and only 45 per cent in the public sector. It is clear that, within countries, the col-
lege wage premium is partly driven by institutional factors when a worker is employed 
in the public sector.11
How is the college wage premium related to country characteristics? Are college 
wage premiums lower in countries where the relative supply of  higher educated work-
ers is low, even after controlling for the differences in skills, skill use, and (mis)match-
ing? And is it lower in countries where educational credentials are only a weak signal 
for underlying skills? Or is the college wage premium related more to institutional 
characteristics, such as the EPL or coverage rate? Figures 1–4 present some descrip-
tive information.12
Figure 1 plots the college wage premium against the percentage of higher educated 
in the labour force of male full-time working employees. This percentage varies from 
15 per cent in Italy to 55 per cent in Japan. Figure 1 shows a clear negative relation. 
The results indicate that the college wage premium, net of skills, the use of these skills, 
or the returns of being in a job where these skills are or are not required, is negatively 
related to the relative supply of higher educated workers. These results confirm H4 
and are in line with previous results that show a negative relation between changes in 
Table 2: Proficient skill use matching model for low, medium, and high educated
Variables
Low educated  
(ISCED 1–2)
Medium educated
(ISCED 3–4)
High educated 
(ISCED 5–6)
Returns to typically required utilization with typically 
required skills
0.728*** 0.805*** 1.036***
(0.043) (0.019) (0.022)
Returns to typically required utilization with higher 
skills
0.451*** 0.578*** 0.647***
(0.103) (0.052) (0.067)
Returns to typically required utilization with lower 
skills
–0.572*** –0.548*** –0.668***
(0.090) (0.050) (0.055)
Returns to overutilization with typically required 
skills
0.699*** 0.551*** 0.662***
(0.183) (0.081) (0.094)
Returns to underutilization with typically required 
skills
–0.168 –0.528*** –0.479***
(0.198) (0.082) (0.075)
Number of individuals 3,742 14,574 10,658
Number of countries 22 22 22
BIC 2,964.6 11,705.6 8,964.4
Variance components
Between variance 0.087 0.098 0.086
Within variance 0.123 0.129 0.133
Total variance 0.210 0.227 0.219
Notes: Parameters multiplied by 100; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; controls 
include age, age squared.
11 The selection into the private or public sector is not random and may depend on skills as well. To 
check this, we ran a separate analysis in which we regressed the education dummies and the skills plus control 
variables on the odds to entering the public sector. There is no effect of skills in this regression, indicating that 
it is unlikely that the selection is based on skills.
12 We only provide figures related to equation (4). The other figures are available upon request.
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the relative supply of the higher educated and changes in the college wage premium 
(Walker and Zhu, 2008; Crivellaro, 2014).
Figure 2 plots the college wage premium against the extent to which educational cre-
dentials provide a strong signal about the underlying skills. This is simply calculated as 
the correlation between years of schooling and the numeracy test scores in each coun-
try. This correlation varies between a low of 0.37 in Cyprus to a high of 0.56 in Belgium. 
Table 3: College wage premium in different models (equations 1–4), separately for public-sector and 
private-sector workers
Public-sector workers
Variables
Model 1
(Eq. 1)
Model 2
(Eq. 2)
Model 3
(Eq. 3)
Model 4
(Eq. 4)
Low educated –20.279***
(1.762)
–12.430***
(1.760)
–12.469***
(1.736)
–11.161***
(1.719)
High educated 24.834*** 17.389*** 15.580*** 11.280***
(0.976) (1.024) (1.033) (1.058)
Controls
Age and age squared yes yes yes yes
Numeracy yes
Proficient skill use yes
Skill mismatch variables yes
Number of individuals 6,125 6,125 6,125 6,041
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
BIC 4,689.4 4,342.6 4,248.7 3,963.3
Variance components
Between variance 0.107 0.109 0.112 0.113
Within variance 0.122 0.115 0.114 0.109
Total variance 0.229 0.226 0.226 0.222
Notes: Parameters multiplied by 100; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Private-sector workers
Variables
Model 1
(Eq. 1)
Model 2
(Eq. 2)
Model 3
(Eq. 3)
Model 4
(Eq. 4)
Low educated –14.406***
(0.814)
   –6.493***
(0.811)
  –4.915***
(0.797)
  –3.991***
(0.788)
High educated 29.491*** 20.721*** 16.218*** 9.878***
(0.602) (0.622) (0.631) (0.652)
Controls
Age and age squared yes yes yes yes
Numeracy yes
Proficient skill use yes
Skill mismatch variables yes
Number of individuals 23,427 23,427 23,427 22,933
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
BIC 23,648.3 22,096.4 21,288.1 19,716.0
Variance components
Between variance 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.089
Within variance 0.159 0.149 0.144 0.137
Total variance 0.265 0.246 0.242 0.226
Notes: Parameters multiplied by 100; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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We observe a weak positive relation (especially when omitting the Slovak Republic), 
indicating that the college wage premium is indeed positively related to the extent to 
which higher education credentials signal higher skill levels, as hypothesized in H5. 
Note that this is true even after controlling for these skills at the individual level. This 
indicates that graduates profit from a strong signal of their skills, even if  they do not 
possess these skills themselves.
It is important to note that the reliability of educational credentials is not at all 
related to the relative supply of higher educated workers. This is shown in Figure 3, 
Figure 1: College wage premium per country plotted against the percentage higher educated
Notes: Based on equation 4 (with controls for age, age squared, proficient skill use plus skill (mis)match): 
R2 = 13.0%.
Figure 2: College wage premium per country plotted against the reliability of the educational credential
Notes: Based on equation 4 (with controls for age, age squared, proficient skill use plus skill (mis)match): 
R2 = 6.0%.
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which plots the reliability of educational credentials against the percentage of higher 
educated in the relevant workforce. We note countries with similar relative supplies of 
higher educated and vastly different signals about the underlying skills (e.g. Japan vs 
Korea, Finland vs United States, or Sweden vs Belgium). This is a relevant conclusion, 
since it means that the expansion of higher education does not imply a blurred relation 
between years of schooling and skills.
Figure 4 plots college wage premiums against the extent to which labour market insti-
tutions dominate the labour market, as indicated by the EPL. This index indicated the 
strictness of regulations on dismissals and temporary contracts and ranges from a low 
Figure 3: Percentage higher educated plotted against the reliability of the educational credential
Note: R2 = 0.5%.
Figure 4: College wage premium per country plotted against the EPL
Notes: Based on equation 4 (with controls for age, age squared, proficient skill use plus skill (mis)match): 
R2 = 0.8%.
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of 0.26 in the United States to a high of 2.92 in the Czech Republic. The figure clearly 
shows no relation whatsoever between a country’s college wage premium and the EPL. 
This is true, regardless of whether or not we control for skills, proficient skill use, or 
(mis)matching in proficient skill use.
We repeat the same analysis, now using a different indicator of labour market institu-
tions: the coverage rate (Figure 5). This coverage rate is the proportion of employees 
covered by a collective labour agreement and ranges from 13.6 per cent in the United 
States to 99 per cent in Austria. The results indicate no relation between the coverage 
rate and the college wage premium after controlling for skills, proficient skill use, or 
(mis)matching in proficient skill use.
V. Conclusions
Workers with a college degree earn substantially more than workers who have no such 
degree. Using recent data from 22 OECD countries, we estimate this college wage pre-
mium to be 28 per cent for male full-time working employees, on average, ranging from 
18 per cent in Sweden to 50 per cent in the Slovak Republic. We used PIAAC data to 
assess whether, within countries, this college wage premium is related to differences in 
the skills profiles of graduates, the use of these skills, or to differences in the returns to 
skills when workers hold jobs that match their skills and skill-use level. Moreover, we 
used these data to determine whether the cross-country variation in these premiums is 
related to the relative supply of higher-educated workers, the reliability of educational 
credentials, and labour market institutions, such as the EPL or the coverage rate.
The results show that the college wage premium is indeed partly explained by the 
higher skill levels of graduates from higher education; however, this is only part of the 
story. College degree holders also receive higher wages, because they are more often 
Figure 5: College wage premium per country plotted against the coverage rate
Notes: Based on equation 4 (with controls for age, age squared, proficient skill use plus skill (mis)match): 
R2 = 0.9%.
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able to use these skills in the jobs they hold. If  we further control for job requirements 
in terms of skill proficiency and skill use, we note that two-thirds of the original college 
wage premium is related to skill, skill use, and the match with the requirements of the 
job. This effect is stronger for workers in the private sector, where the college wage pre-
mium drops by 72 per cent after controlling for these factors. For workers in the public 
sector, this drop in the college wage premium is 45 per cent.
The results largely favour a human capital interpretation of the college wage pre-
mium. Higher-educated graduates earn more than medium-educated graduates because 
they have higher skill levels and are working in jobs where they can use these skills more 
often and where these skills are actually required. However, this holds more for the 
private sector than for the public sector, indicating that, at least in the public sector, the 
college wage premium is to some extent driven by institutional factors rather than being 
a premium for higher skills, skill use, or skill requirements.
We find no effect of labour market institutions (EPL or coverage rate) on the cross-
country differences in the college wage premium. This result is in line with the find-
ings of Crivellaro (2014). The cross-country variation in the college wage premium is, 
however, related to the relative supply of higher-educated workers. As shown in previ-
ous research, changes in the relative supply drive changes in the college wage premium 
within countries (Goldin and Katz, 2007; Walker and Zhu, 2008; Crivellaro, 2014). 
Controlling for skills, skill use, and matching with job requirements in these areas, we 
also find a negative relation between a country’s relative supply of graduates and the 
college wage premium. This means that policy-makers and prospective students must 
be aware that expansion of the higher education system will have a negative effect on 
returns to higher education degrees.
We also find evidence that cross-country differences in the college wage premium 
are related to how strongly educational credentials signal skills (Arrow, 1973, Spence, 
1973). The college wage premium is highest in countries where this signal is strong. This 
is even the case when we control for skills at the individual level, suggesting that this 
signalling value also increases the wage premium for college-educated workers who lack 
such skills. It is important to note that the reliability of educational credentials is not at 
all related to the relative supply of the higher educated. There are countries with simi-
lar relative supplies of higher-educated workers and vastly different signals about the 
underlying skills. The expansion of higher education, therefore, does not automatically 
imply a blurred relation between years of schooling and skills. This result is important 
for policy-makers, since the potential negative effect of the expansion of higher educa-
tion could thus be offset by strengthening the signalling value of diplomas. The rele-
vant implication is that policy-makers aiming to increase enrolment in higher education 
should make sure that the selection on relevant skills is increased at the same time.
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